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ABSTRACT

Demand Curves and the Pricing of Money Management

One reason why funds charge different prices to their investors is that they face different
demand curves. One source of differentiation is asset retention: performance-sensitive
investors migrate from worse to better prospects, taking their performance-sensitivity
with them. In the cross section we show that past attrition significantly influences the
current pricing of retail, but not institutional, funds. In time series we show that the repricing of retail funds after merging in new shareholders is predicted by the estimated
effect on its demand curve. This result is robust to other influences on re-pricing,
including asset and account-size changes.

What accounts for the dispersion of mutual-fund fees? In principle it could reflect
dispersion of performance expectations, but the finance literature does not support that
view. Most of the literature considers equity funds, where ex post performance
apparently goes the wrong way: the worst performers charge the highest average fees
(Carhart (1997)), and the most expensive funds deliver the worst average net
performance (Gruber (1996)). But since equity-fund returns are so noisy and risk
adjustments are so ambiguous, it is worth looking instead at the money-fund industry,
and there the evidence is qualitatively similar but much stronger. Over a given period,
money funds realize very similar gross returns but deliver very different net returns to
investors because the dispersion of their fees is so wide (see, e.g., Bogle (1994), Fredman
and Wiles (1998), Domian and Reichenstein (1998)). With no reasonable basis for
expecting differential performance, why do these funds’ investors pay differential fees?
We consider the possibility that the difference lies in the investors themselves.
A consumer brings her own tastes, beliefs and assets to the financial market, and
these imply a personal demand curve for mutual-fund shares. On the other side of the
market, a given mutual fund imputes consumers’ demand curves into its pricing but all
the hundreds of millions of consumers do not have to enter this equation unconditionally
and identically. The fund would intuitively have relatively more access to a much
smaller subset of consumers, so that their demand curves enter relatively more. This
would be a trivial point if the subsets of the various funds were unbiased samples, but
there are reasons to suspect they are not. The one we primarily focus on here is the
finding by Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) that investors vary in their responses to
changes in funds’ prospects. Some money flows from worse to better prospects but other

1

money does not, increasing the density of performance-sensitive investors in the betterprospect funds and performance-insensitive investors in the others. Since fees are simply
reductions of performance, this has a straightforward pricing implication: investors
remaining in the worse prospects should be charged more.
This logic is borrowed from the home-mortgage literature (e.g. Schwartz and
Torous (1989)) which observes that the mortgagors who remain in a fixed-rate pool after
a refinancing opportunity have self-selected. They are relatively less sensitive to
refinancing opportunities so the present value of their future payments (credit-risk issues
aside) is at a premium. The better was the opportunity, the greater the self-selection and
the bigger the premium. This well-known element of consumers’ liability management
could extend to their assets, and our primary goal is to see if it does. Our secondary goal
is to see if demand-curve variation in general, regardless of source, explains price
variation.
We test the demand-side pricing model on the American money-fund industry.
This venue choice serves several purposes. As indicated above, the similarity of gross
returns obviates performance-based explanations of fee differences and makes relative
prospects easy to measure accurately. We maximize this benefit by focusing on a single
subcategory, the largest, of retail money funds. Also, we need funds that can adjust fees
up or down at will, which describes most money funds due to the widespread practice of
fee-waiving (Christoffersen (2001)). And finally, we don’t want interference from the
capital-gains tax.
The empirical tests come in three groups. In the first group we establish the basic
dynamics of the subcategory we focus on, some of which are familiar from elsewhere.
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The funds charge a wide range of fees, their relative returns are driven almost exclusively
by relative fees and are highly persistent, and their net flows are sensitive to past returns
in the region of high past returns. Cross-sectional regressions find no relation between
fees and service offerings.
The second group directly tests the model, which we call the seasoning model,
inspired by Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999). In parallel with the mortgage-pool
example, we test cross-sectionally whether retail investors who remain after relatively
more attrition pay relatively higher fees. We find that they do, whether or not we control
for fund size. An investor who remains after 50% attrition pays about 10bp (bp = basis
point, 1/100 or 1%) more. We show this is not true for institutional investors; if
anything, they are charged less after attrition. The cross section of fees also relates
significantly to the cross section of distribution methods. Contractual fees are about the
same for broker- and directly-distributed funds, but the directly-distributed funds choose
to charge significantly less, consistent with the evidence in Capon, Fitzsimons and Prince
(1996) and Alexander, Jones and Nigro (1998) that the investors who arrive through
brokers are significantly less price-sensitive.
Finally, we test for demand-curve effects in general by analyzing the re-pricing of
funds after mergers. The useful feature of a merger is that it implies a discrete shift in the
surviving fund’s demand curve, i.e. the aggregate demand of its investor base, while
controlling for other potentially important features of the surviving fund. After merging
in the target’s shareholders, the surviving fund faces its previous demand curve combined
with the demand curve of the target fund, but a fund share is essentially the same as
before, assuming service quality remains constant. We solve a simple model that predicts
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a surviving fund’s re-pricing by backing out estimates of the separate funds’ demand
curves and picking the profit-maximizing price along their combination.
Looking across a sample of mergers from 1988 through 1997, we find that the
demand-side model explains a significant portion of price revisions. This holds even
when we control for the expected re-pricing due to the change in fund size and average
account size across the merger. The result is especially strong when the acquiring funds
have pre-merger fee waivers, consistent with their wider latitude to re-price frictionlessly.
Unconditionally, mergers appear as likely to raise prices as lower them, but our measures
of demand-curve innovations reliably identify which funds will charge more or less, and
by how much.
The rest of the paper is in five sections. Section I describes the data. Section II
covers the literature and the important features of the money-fund industry, and motivates
our hypothesis. Section III tests the cross section of fees for sensitivity to past attrition
and to distribution channels, Section IV solves the demand-curve model and tests it on
time series of prices around mergers, and Section V summarizes and concludes.
1. Data
The database for the empirical tests combines data from several sources. The first
source is the weekly newsletter Money Fund Report (MFR) published by IBC/Donoghue.
Among other things, it reports the assets under management and seven-day yield (total
return to investors over the past 7 days, times 365/7) as of each Tuesday for all funds that
voluntarily report. The publishers estimate that over 95% of funds report, and the data
cover November 1987 through July 1997. The largest category of funds tracked is what
MFR calls Tier 1 and Tier 2 retail funds: retail funds that invest in the whole range of
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money market instruments (i.e. not restricted to municipal issues or some combination of
Treasury and Agency issues). As of August 31, 1998, there were 293 such funds,
managing $538 Billion (out of the $1.229 Trillion managed by all money funds). We
also use the MFR data on institutional (i.e. intended for institutional shareholders) Tier 1
and Tier 2 funds, of which there were 171 on August 31, 1998, managing $223 Billion.
This data are not survivor-biased; for each week, it includes every fund that chose to
report that week.
The publishers inquired after each fund that stopped reporting, and identified all
the funds that stopped because they had merged into other funds. They identified 47
mergers of Tier 1 or Tier 2 retail funds into other Tier 1 or Tier 2 retail funds between
1987 and 1997. These mergers, listed in the Appendix, are the ones we study below. In
addition to tracking asset size and yield for each fund, IBC Donoghue separately
provided us with pre- and post-merger average account size for 40 of the surviving funds.
We also acquired average account data from a 1995 industry survey by Lipper reporting
average account size, total net assets and fees of 72 retail Tier 1 and Tier 2 money funds.
The MFR data do not include expense ratios, so we collected those from
elsewhere. Most of the expense data is from Lipper; for each fund they cover we have the
total fee charged to investors and the year-end assets under management for each fiscal
year they have been tracked. These figures are the actual fees paid by investors, so they
combine advisory and administrative fees and are net of any expense waivers applied by
the fund. We matched the Lipper and MFR databases by hand, checking that the time
series of assets under management correspond. Some of the mergers occurred too late for
our database to show a fee for a fiscal year after the merger. In these cases, we looked up
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the fee in the SEC filings available on LEXIS/NEXIS. Pre-merger fees for two funds
were not in the Lipper data or the SEC filings, so most of the tests analyze 45 of the 47
mergers. Also from Lipper we have the pre-merger fee waiver (if any) of 38 of the
surviving funds. Lastly, we collected data from Lipper Analytical on distribution
channels used by 244 retail funds in 1995 along with a breakdown of gross expense ratios
into waivers and advisory, non-advisory, and 12b1 fees.
2.

Self-Selection by Mutual Fund Investors

2.1

Equity Funds
The largest part of the finance literature on mutual funds concerns the

measurement and prediction of performance. Some of the recent studies demonstrate
modest performance persistence among equity funds. For example, both Carhart (1997)
and Brown and Goetzmann (1995) show that expected future performance increases in
past performance, and that this persistence is especially strong for the worst past
performers.
The predictability begs the question as to how investors’ allocations across funds
respond to past returns. This has been the subject of several studies, including Ippolito
(1992), Goetzmann and Peles (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano
(1998), all of which show allocations increasing with past returns, particularly in the
region of better past returns. Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) find that the net flows earn
above-market returns, and propose that some investors are more active or sophisticated
than others, benefiting from chasing persistence while the less active or sophisticated stay
put and earn below the market.
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The existence and significance of inactive investors is especially apparent with
the worst performers. The canonical example is the Steadman family of funds, which
performed well and attracted many investors in the 1960s but which later placed
consistently last or near last in performance rankings while losing many but not all
investors (see Brandstrader (1992)). The remaining investors could in principle have
expected improved management performance, but with fees exceeding 20% per year,1 the
underperformance was all but guaranteed.
The Steadman combination of higher fees and worse prospects is not an isolated
case. Carhart (1997) shows that funds with past performance in the lowest two deciles
have not only worse average future performance gross of fees than the other deciles, but
also higher fees. Whatever the reason for the higher fees, the remaining investors have
distinguished themselves from the population in general, and the funds’ original investors
in particular, as relatively more willing to pay high prices for bad prospects.
2.2

Analogous Results for Money Funds
The interaction between fees, assets and prospects is richer among money funds

since the cross section of fees is, to a close approximation, the cross section of
underperformance. Figure 1 is a histogram of the fees charged by money funds2 in their
1996 fiscal years, showing most fees between 40 and 100 bp, but also a fat tail ranging up
to 200 bp and two funds charging nothing. Market commentators (e.g. Malkiel (1996),
Bogle (1994), Fredman and Wiles (1998)) often mention that this dispersion in fees is the
major source of dispersion in performance. Domian and Reichenstein (1998) tests this
proposition and find that fees (plus a dummy variable indicating government-only funds)
explain 84% of the variation in performance.
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[Figure 1]
For our sample, if we plot the 1996 net performance P of the funds in Figure 1
(i.e. net return3 in 1996 minus the value-weighted average total return of all other money
funds over the same months) against the net fee f, we get Figure 2, which shows an
extremely close relation. Regressing net performance on fees, we get (t-statistics in
parentheses):
=

Pi

0.610
(44.9)

-1.031fi
(-60.4)

+ εi

R2 = 94%
N(obs)=224

The slope of –1 and the R2 of 94 percent confirm that the funds all generate
approximately the same gross return (standard deviation is 10bp) then deliver different
net returns to investors by charging different fees (standard deviation is 35bp). Money
funds are commodity-like in the similarity of their gross returns, but they charge
significantly different prices. It follows that the persistence of money fund net
performance reflects whatever persistence there is in fees.
[Figure 2]
We can gauge the actual persistence in money fund performance by comparing
adjacent years. For each money fund in each year from 1989 to 1995, we calculate net
performance (net return less the value-weighted index) in that year and also in the next.
Figure 3 plots the latter against the former, showing persistence far stronger than that of
equity funds. For example, Brown and Goetzmann (1995) find that 993 of 2,401
“winner” years of equity funds were followed by “loser” years, whereas in Figure 3, only
87 of 615 winner years precede loser years. Because fees tend to persist, performance
persists too.
[Figure 3]
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Do investors impute this persistence into their allocations, the way they appear to
with equity funds? With the weekly data we can examine this issue at a high resolution.
Every other week, we calculate for each fund the current net returns and fund flows over
the next two weeks where

FLOWt +1 =

Assett +1 − Assett * (1 + NetReturnt +1 ) .4
Assett

We sort into

performance bins, and report the bin medians as Figure 4.
[Figure 4]
The relation takes the convex form already detected in equity funds. Flows are
positive and sensitive to past performance in the region of good past performance, and
negative but relatively insensitive in the region of bad past performance. It is worth
noting that this asymmetry is unrelated to the capital-gains tax; there are no capital gains,
realized or unrealized, with money funds.
Figures 2 through 4 illustrate some of the rich strategic environment of a money
fund’s pricing decision. A very low fee would presumably generate operating losses but
it almost guarantees very high performance that induces inflow, especially from active
investors. Higher fees increase current profits but they almost guarantee lower
performance that induces outflow by active investors, to the extent that the fund still has
active investors. So the pricing decision simultaneously affects current and future profits,
net inflow, and the performance-sensitivity of shareholders.
[Figure 5]
The operating history of the Dreyfus Worldwide Dollar Fund (DWDF) is perhaps
the largest-scale example of this interaction. Figure 5 shows the fees charged (left axis,
by fiscal year) and assets managed (right axis, weekly) by this fund over the sample
period. This fund charged very little in its first two years, during which time its yield
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regularly ranked at or near the top of all money funds, and its assets grew to $10 billion.
Over time it raised its price, and assets fell to $2 billion. The low early fees were
interpreted at the time as a "loss leader” strategy, the putative goal being to “lure
investors into the fund family with an above-average yield in the hope that they can be
sold other products later.”5 Indeed, a Dreyfus executive called the fund a success because
“75 percent of the customers attracted were new to Dreyfus, and 50 percent had never
before invested in a mutual fund.”6
But whatever its motive, the pricing strategy had a potentially important effect on
the price-sensitivity of current shareholders. After two years of low fees, shareholders
were a price-sensitive group that left quickly when the fund charged 23 and then 47 bp,
both below-average prices. After several years of much higher fees, the remaining assets
stabilized at 20% of their former level. Just as there are non-price reasons to leave a
mortgage pool (e.g. moving to a new job), there are non-performance reasons for leaving
a mutual fund (e.g. buying a house) but the selection for performance-insensitivity among
the 20% remaining was, intuitively, intense and economically significant.
From its investors’ point of view, a fund’s fee is simply a direct reduction of
performance, so performance-insensitivity implies price-insensitivity which, holding all
else constant, implies a higher optimal price. Other things equal, a fund should charge
relatively more if its current investors are relatively less price-sensitive. The rest of the
paper explores the significance of this dynamic to management pricing.
3.

Self-Selection and the Cross Section of Fees
Do fund flows imply self-selection that is important to pricing? We can not

observe everything that a fund’s management company learns about its investors, but we
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can observe the week-to-week fluctuation of its assets. If greater outflows correspond to
more self-selection for price insensitivity, then a fund that has experienced greater
outflow should charge more. This is not the only potential source of cross sectional
demand-curve variation, but it is one that is straightforward to measure accurately. We
test for the relation first in the panel of retail funds, and then for contrast in a panel of
institutional funds. Another potential source of demand-curve variation is the tendency,
documented by Capon, Fitzsimons and Prince (1996) and Alexander, Jones and Nigro
(1998), for investors with different levels of investing sophistication and knowledge to
invest through different distribution channels. Specifically, the more informed and
sophisticated invest directly, rather than through brokers. We analyze the cross sectional
relation between fee elements and distribution channels, testing whether directlydistributed funds price as if their investors are more price-sensitive.
3.1

Cross sectional relation between fees and past attrition
The empirical question is whether the fee dispersion in Figures 1 and 2 is

explained by dispersion in previous net fund flows. For each fund i with fiscal-year 1996
fee fi (in annual percent) we calculate Qi, its total net assets in the last week of fiscal-year
1995, and MAXi, the maximum total net assets reported for i over all weeks up to the last
of fiscal-year 1995. So Qi/MAXi is i’s asset retention, and 1 - Qi/MAXi is i’s attrition, as
of the end of fiscal-year 1995. If the price-sensitivity of a fund’s current investors
decreases as its attrition increases, and if this consideration is important to pricing, we
should find that fi goes up as attrition goes up, i.e. Qi/MAXi goes down. Previous
research (e.g. Cook and Duffield (1979), Baumol et al. (1990)) has shown money funds’
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asset size to be important to their pricing, so we include Qi as a separate explanatory
variable in this analysis.
We run four cross sectional regressions on the retail fund panel, which has 200
usable observations. The dependent variable is always f, and the independent variables
are first just Q/MAX by itself, then Q/MAX and Q, then Q/MAX and Q and Q2, to allow
asset size to enter non-linearly, and finally asset size by itself. The prediction is that
Q/MAX enters negatively. Results are in Panel A of Table 1.
[Table 1]
The null hypothesis of a non-negative influence of Q/MAX is rejected by all
specifications. The coefficient is not only consistently significant but also quite stable as
we allow asset size to enter in different ways. The coefficient estimate of –0.2
corresponds to a 10bp higher fee after 50% attrition, controlling for the asset shrinkage
caused by the attrition, which has its own separate effect on the fee. In unreported results,
we find that Q/MAX enters significantly in the subset of funds without breakpoints in
their fee schedules, indicating that breakpoints do not drive the results, and we also find
that the effect of Q/MAX across non-waiving funds is almost identical to its effect across
waiving funds.7 Since waiving funds are by construction not charging their contractual
limits, this indicates that contract limits are not driving the result either.
The attrition intuition applies much less to the shareholders of institutional funds,
so it is worth repeating the four regressions on the institutional fund panel, which has 97
usable observations. In this panel, we would not expect attrition to influence future
pricing, so the prediction is that Q/MAX does not enter. Results are in Panel B of Table
1.
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The institutional-fund results are a strong contrast to the retail-fund results. The
coefficient on Q/MAX is never negative. It is insignificantly positive when size is not
included, and it is significantly positive when size is included, which is interesting. For
our purposes the important point is that the relation between attrition and future pricing is
not only robust to size considerations but also specific to funds with consumers as
shareholders.
The attrition/future price relation of retail funds, and its contrast to the relation
among institutional funds, is presented graphically as Figure 6. Asset retention increases,
so attrition decreases, from left to right on the x-axis. The fiscal-year 1996 net expense
ratio is on the y-axis, in annual percent. Funds are sorted into five Q/MAX bins, (0,0.2]
through (0.8,1], and the bin averages are shown. Retail fees are generally much higher,
but they decline as the fund’s assets at the fiscal-year-beginning approach their historical
maximum.
[Figure 6]
3.2

Cross sectional relation between fees and distribution channels
The attrition results support the view that self-selection influences pricing and that

demand differs across retail money funds. Still, we cannot rule out a passive scenario
where some funds simply charge more than others year after year without regard to selfselection, experiencing attrition along the way. We can’t be sure if fees drive the fund
flows or vice versa. One way around this chicken-and-egg problem is to relate fees
instead to distribution channels, since they are not effects of past fees and since surveys
show significant systematic differences of investor types, especially as relate to price
sensitivity, across distribution channels.
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Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996) and Alexander, Jones, and Nigro (1998)
summarize survey responses of mutual fund investors and argue that investors who arrive
through the direct channel appear more price-sensitive than those brought in by a sales
force. Funds pricing off the less price-sensitive demand curves should charge more. We
can test this proposition with Lipper data on the distribution channels and fee elements,
as of 1995, of 244 retail money funds. The distribution channels are “Direct Primary,”
“Direct Secondary,” “Dealer,” “Broker/Dealer,” “Wirehouse,” “Captive,” “Retail
Banking,” “Insurance,” “Affinity,” and “Employee.” The first two categories constitute
the Direct group, the next four constitute the Broker group, and the last four do not
group. For fund i we have its end-of-fiscal-year 1995 total net assets, Qi , its expense
ratio gross of fee waivers, GROSSi, and net of waivers, NETi, and the implied waiver
WAIVEi, and the three elements of NETi: Advisory Fee (ADVi), Non-Advisory Fee
(NADVi) and 12b-1 (12B1i). The empirical question is how the fee and the fee elements
vary across the distribution-channel types, and in particular, whether the investors who
arrive via brokers are charged more.
We run six regressions in which the dependent variable is a fee component, and
the independent variables are indicators for distribution-channel types and the log of asset
size. For each regression we include an F-test for the null hypothesis that the Broker and
Direct funds have the same mean. Results are in Table 2.
[Table 2]
We see that the gross expense ratios of Broker and Direct funds are about the
same on average; their difference is small and statistically insignificant. However, their
waivers, and therefore their net expense ratios, are significantly different by about 20bp,
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around a third of Direct funds’ net fees. So Dealer funds are cheaper because their
sponsors find it preferable, rather than contractually necessary, to charge less.8 Among
the other components we find higher 12b-1 fees for Broker funds, as would be expected
considering that brokers are generally compensated out of 12b-1 fees, and we also find
higher advisory, but not non-advisory, fees. Since it is hard to imagine why brokerintermediated funds would be more expensive to advise, this difference is more evidence
that their higher fees are chosen strategically, to maximize profits off their less pricesensitive investors.
Another way to sort out this chicken-and-egg problem is to look instead at fee
changes around fund mergers. A fund merger is an exogenous shock to the demand curve
of the surviving fund, so we can observe the significance of demand-curve variation to
pricing by first measuring the shock and then comparing our measurement to the price
change, from before the merger to after, of the surviving fund. By comparing the
surviving fund to itself at a different time, we isolate the demand-curve effect by
reducing variation in for fund-specific pricing considerations, such as the perceived
quality of its services. The next section develops a simple model of re-pricing due to
mergers and tests it on the merger sample.
4.

Price Changes around Mergers
The goal of this section is to establish the significance of demand-curve variation

to price variation with an analysis of re-pricing after mergers. For each merger in the
sample period we estimate the change in the surviving fund’s demand curve, and from
that we predict the change in the surviving fund’s price. The cross section of realized
price changes is compared to the cross section of predictions. To this end we solve a
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simple model which infers the surviving and disappearing funds’ pre-merger demand
curves and combines them to predict the optimal price revision.
The demand-curve variation that is relevant to pricing may result from the
seasoning dynamic of the previous section, or instead from some other differences in the
funds’ circumstances. Since a fund has comparatively better access to consumers already
invested in the other financial products within its complex, one potentially important
difference in funds’ circumstances is the variety and operating histories of these other
products. Similarly, a load complex (e.g. Fidelity, Putnam) would attract investors with
different plans, tastes and beliefs than would a no-load complex (e.g. Vanguard, Scudder)
and these attributes could correlate with price-sensitivity. There are many other potential
circumstances that could determine the type of consumer in closer reach of a fund
complex, such as the demographics of the communities where bank branches sell its
product (e.g. the communities with Mellon PSFS branches pitching Dreyfus), or of the
personnel of firms including the complex on pension-plan menus. The empirical
question we address with our model is whether demand-curve variation from all sources
is important to pricing. We also test directly for the seasoning dynamic, though without
imposing any structure with a formal model.
Before we start testing, it is worth noting that we are not analyzing why funds
merge, and that in fact if price-sensitivity were the only consideration in managementpricing, funds would not degrade their price-discrimination by merging. The
presumption is that some unmodeled efficiency gain motivates the merger with a benefit
exceeding the discrimination-related cost. It is potentially important that money-fund
mergers generally result from financial institution mergers (see the Appendix), and an
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institution can reduce the mismatch between merger-partners’ shareholders to the extent
it has a variety of partners to choose from. Nations Funds, for example, has 65 money
funds of all types, including 7 in the Tier 1/Tier 2 retail category, whereas Legg Mason
lists 3 total, with only 1 in the Tier 1/Tier 2 retail category,9 suggesting that Nations can
merge shareholders with relatively more similar shareholders than can Legg Mason.
[Figure 7]
We can get some sense of the shareholders’ pre-merger similarity by comparing
the fees they were paying. Let m index the 47 mergers, and for each merger let fund 1 be
the surviving fund (as identified by MFR), and fund 2 be the disappearing fund, so that
(abusing our previous notation slightly) f1,m and f2,m are the pre-merger fees of the
surviving and disappearing funds, respectively, and f12,m is the post-merger fee. Figure 7
plots f1,m on f2,m, showing a generally positive relation. Its statistical significance is
apparent in a simple regression (t-statistics in parentheses):
f1,m

= 0.470
(4.97)

+0.288f2,m
(2.47)

+ εm

R2 = 10.3%
N(obs)=45

The residual mismatch between the funds’ shareholders is the focus of the analysis. A
description and motivation of the estimated fees is next, followed by the empirical tests.
4.1

Pricing Model
The model assumes that a fund chooses its fee fk,m, k ∈ {1,2,12}, to maximize its

current profits given its current investors’ price-sensitivity, which is assumed linear. The
marginal cost of managing an extra dollar is fixed at c, so the managers’ programs are
simply to maximize total revenue (fk,m –c)*Qk,m, where Qk,m is assets under management.
Downward-sloping demand curves drive the maximizations; before the merger, each fund
faces the demand curve
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Qk,m(fk,m) = ak,m – (bk,m/2) fk,m

(1)

where ak,m and bk,m are positive numbers. Some familiar math shows the optimal fee and
assets for fund k to be f*k,m = ak,m/bk,m + c/2 and Q*k,m = ak,m/2 – bk,mc/4, so our estimate of
fund k’s demand curve before the merger, given our observations of optimal fees, f*k,m,
and optimal asset size, Q*k,m, is
Q k ,m =

2 Q k*, m
f k*, m − c

*

( f k*, m −

Q k ,m
c
)− *
f k ,m
2
f k ,m − c

(2)

The merger combines the demand curves of the funds, so the resulting demand curve
relating the post-merger price f12,m and quantity Q12,m of the merged surviving fund is
Q12, m =

2Q2*, m
Q1*, m
Q2*,m
c
c
( f 1*,m − ) + *
( f 2*,m − ) − ( *
+ *
) f 12, m (3)
2
2
−c
f 2,m − c
f 1,m − c f 2, m − c

2Q1*,m
f 1*,m

implying the optimal fee

f

*

12 , m

 2Q1*,m
c
( f 1*,m − ) +
 *
2
 f 1, m − c
=
2Q1*,m
( *
+
f 1, m − c

c 
( f 2*,m − )
2 
−c

2Q2*, m
f 2*,m
2Q

*
2, m

f 2*,m − c

)

+

c
2

(4)

A little algebra shows
f*12,m-f*1,m = [(Q*2,m (f*1,m-c))/(Q*1,m(f*2,m-c) +Q*2,m(f*1,m-c)](f*2,m-f*1,m)

(5)

This is the predicted price revision of the surviving fund as a function of variables we can
observe, except for the marginal cost c which we must estimate. The optimal price
revision is in the direction of the disappearing fund’s fee, and the magnitude depends on
the funds’ relative sizes.
Some comments on the modeling choices:
The linear demand curves keep the model tractable and transparent, and they have
the useful feature of being recoverable from observable price and quantity data. One way
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to map this model to the question of relative price sensitivity is to assume that a given
investor j has demand curve qj = a - (bj /2)f. Everybody has the same demand a at zero
price, but different price sensitivities. If the average bj of the n investors remaining in a
fund’s investor base is b, then the optimal fee is (na)/(nb) +c/2= a/b+c/2, so a higher
average price sensitivity corresponds to a lower fee.
Although the model accounts for marginal costs, c, these are not directly
observable. Because Vanguard is considered to charge close to cost, we used its fee of
approximately 32 bp between 1990 to 1995 to proxy for marginal costs. The results are
robust to the choice of c.10
Our assumption that funds can move prices up or down from one day to the next
represents the widespread practice of fee waiving. Christoffersen (2001) shows over
60% of retail money funds waiving fees in 1995. These funds can generally start
charging more or less on any day, without approval from shareholders. It is worth
keeping in mind, though, that the latitude of funds to move all the way to the new profitmaximizing fee may be limited by the merger-related regulation in the Investment
Company Act of 1940. Section 15(f) requires that the assignment of an investment
advisory contract not impose an “unfair burden” on shareholders (15(f)(1)(B)), and that
compensation “other than bona fide ordinary compensation as principal underwriter” in
the first two post-assignment years would constitute an unfair burden (15(f)(2)(B)).
Empirically, this has not prevented fee increases for either surviving-fund or
disappearing-fund shareholders (see the Appendix), but there may be some restraining
effect on re-pricing which would arguably make it more difficult for to detect the effect
of demand-curve variation on optimal pricing. In any case, we can address concerns
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about the feasibility of fee increases by non-waiving funds by limiting the sample to the
mergers where the surviving fund was waiving before the merger.
Modeling the managers as maximizing the current profits of their money funds
abstracts from the profits of the family’s other funds and the tradeoff between current and
future profits, both of which appear important in the Dreyfus case. A usable model of the
pricing problem’s extensive form may be solvable, but is beyond the scope of this paper
and our database. The error terms in the regressions are meant to pick up adjustments in
price serving objectives other than current profits.
Finally, it is worth noting that our prediction for the merged fund’s fee is similar
to an asset-weighted average of the unmerged funds’ fees. So if, in place of our analysis,
we assumed that 1) funds set fees equal to costs, and 2) the cost of a merged fund equals
the sum of the costs of the merging funds, we would make a similar estimate of the
merged fund’s fee. The cross sectional evidence of higher pricing for less price-sensitive
investors supports our view that fees are not mechanically equated to costs. We return to
this “asset-weighted cost” perspective below.
4.2 Empirical Results with the Pricing Model
We first test the prediction that the surviving fund changes its price in the
direction of the disappearing fund’s fee. For this purpose, the empirical question is how
the sign of f12,m - f1,m compares with the sign of f2,m -f1,m. The comparison is summarized
by Panel A of Table 3, which sorts mergers into rows by f2,m - f1,m, and into columns by
f12,m - f1,m. The null hypothesis is that rows are independent of columns, and the test
statistic is the χ2 with 4 degrees of freedom.
[Table 3]
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The results show the surviving fund’s price moving significantly in the predicted
direction; when a fund absorbs new investors who had been paying more, it charges
more. One way to read the panel is that 14 of the 24 times a fund absorbed shareholders
of a higher-priced fund, its own price subsequently increased, and that 11 of the 18 times
it absorbed a lower-priced fund, its own price declined. The test of independence is
rejected, with a p-value of 0.038, in favor of a positive relation between f2,m - f1,m and
f12,m - f1,m.
Next we test whether the cross section of predicted price changes explains the
cross section of actual price changes. We plug the observed values of Q1,m, Q2,m, f1,m and
f2,m, and also our estimate c = 32bp into equation 5 to generate the predicted price
changes, and then regress the actual price changes f12,m - f1,m on these predictions. The
test statistic is the t-statistic for the coefficient on the predictions. The regression results
are in Panel A of Table 4.
[Table 4]
Again the results are significantly in the predicted direction. The cross sectional
coefficient on the predicted price change is significantly greater than zero, and also not
significantly different from 1, its predicted value. From our demand-curve perspective we
can foresee a significant portion of a fund’s re-pricing after it merges in another fund’s
shareholders.
An alternate explanation for the relation between the re-pricing of the surviving
fund and the relative price of the target fund is that the merger changes the surviving
fund’s costs in the direction of the target fund’s costs. For example, the target fund’s
shareholders cost more or less per dollar to service, so that the surviving fund’s cost per
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dollar changes. Some additional data gives this alternate model a chance to explain the
price changes.
Because a fund has account-specific responsibilities (e.g. postage, accounting) we
would expect a fixed cost per account, so that the cost per dollar managed, and
consequently the fee, is lower if the average account size is higher. Indeed, this is the
standard explanation for the lower fees of institutional funds. By this reasoning, a fund’s
shareholders are more expensive per dollar if their average account size is lower, so if a
fund with a higher average account size merges in these shareholders, its cost per dollar
should go up, driving up its fee. At the same time, the surviving fund gains assets, and
this should drive down its fee. In cross-sectional regressions of money funds’ fees on
their assets and average account sizes, Cook and Duffield (1979) and Baumol et al.
(1990) find significantly negative coefficients on both. The negative relation between
fees and size does not support the asset-weighted cost view described above, since it
implies that the total cost of a merged fund should be lower than the costs of the separate
funds.
To account for the effects of assets and average account size on price adjustment,
we repeat the price-change tests with f12,m - f1,m replaced by f12,m - fexp12,m, where fexp12,m f1,m is the expected price change conditional on the change in the surviving fund’s assets
and average account size. To generate this expectation, we first estimate, from the
general population of funds indexed by i, the dependence of fees, fi, on assets, Qi, and
average account size, AVGACCi with the cross sectional regression of Cook and Duffield
(1979), using their log specification (t-statistics in parentheses):11
log(fi) = 1.81 -0.0777log(Qi)
(3.47) (-2.94)

-0.169log(AVGACCi) + εi
(-3.20)
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R2 = 23.1%
N(obs)=72

We replicate the finding of significant influence, in the predicted direction, of assets and
average account size. So the formula for fexp12,m in terms of Q1,m and Q2,m and of
AVGACC1,m and AVGACC12,m, its pre- and post-merger average account size, is
fexp12,m = f1,m[(Q1,m+Q2,m)/Q1,m]-0.0777[AVGACC12,m/AVGACC1,m]-0.169.
For AVGACC1,m and AVGACC12,m we use the average account size over the last six premerger months and the first six post-merger months, respectively.12 There are 39
mergers with both fee and average account size data. We calculate fexp12,m for each and
repeat the directional test of Table 3 and the cross sectional regression of Table 4 on
f12,m - fexp12,m. Results are in Panel B of Table 3 and Panel A of Table 4, respectively.
The results are quite similar to the unadjusted results. The cross sectional
regression coefficient is again significantly greater than zero and not significantly
different from one. The p-value on the non-parametric test is only marginally significant,
but this could be an artifact of rounding. That is, our fee data is only in whole numbers
of basis points but our new baseline fexp12,m is more precise than that, so for example fexp12
for the Dreyfus/Laurel fund is 70.38bp, and the reported post-merger fee is 70bp. If
Dreyfus/Laurel charged exactly fexp12 it would show up in our test as charging less. To
cure this problem we repeat the test with fexp12,m rounded off to the nearest basis point.
The results, in Panel C of Table 3, show that this apples-to-apples comparison restores
the statistical significance. So while asset and average account size matter to pricing, and
while they do change as a result of mergers, these changes do not account for the
explanatory power of our model.
As discussed above, mergers where the acquiring fund waived fees before the
merger are the best subjects for our analysis. We can identify the pre-merger waiving
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activity of 35 acquiring funds; 20 were waiving, and 15 were not. In Table 4, the
regressions of Panel A are repeated on the waiving subsample in Panel B, and on the nonwaiving subsample in Panel C. Consistent with the intuition, we find a strong and
significant relation between the actual and predicted fee changes in the waiving sample.
There is no significant relation in the non-waiving sample, but with only 15 observations
this failure to reject is not very informative. We repeat also the non-parametric tests of
Table 3 on the subsamples. To conserve space we report only the test statistics,13 to the
right of the test statistics for the full sample. The results for the waiving funds are close
to those for the full sample, significant for the first and third specifications and
marginally significant for the second, but non-waiving funds show significance for only
the first specification. The strong results for waiving funds support the strategic-pricing
perspective, and the weaker results for non-waiving funds suggest that contracting
restrictions may constrain fund sponsors from reaching their optimal fees.
There could in principle be meaningful changes in service quality that affect
pricing, but we have no way to observe this sort of change so we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the observed repricing reflects asset-weighting of the service qualities of
the merging funds.14 Our tactic of using mergers to compare the surviving fund to its
earlier self is meant to serve as a control along this dimension; also this alternate model
does not deliver the relation between attrition and fees in Table 1.
4.3 Estimating Demand from Attrition
Finally, we can approach the re-pricing problem from the seasoning angle of the
previous section. The merging funds’ observed fees and assets are informative about
their demand curves to the extent they were maximizing current profits. But even if the

24

funds were pricing to several objectives, the logic that more attrition means less pricesensitivity among the remaining investors should still hold. So if a fund absorbs
investors who remain after more attrition than do its current investors it should, other
things equal, raise its price.
To test this hypothesis, we add relative attrition to the above model explaining the
price changes with asset and average account size changes. Let Rk,m represent
Qk,m/MAXk,m, defined as before, of fund k just before the merger, so that R2,m/R1,m
estimates the relative asset retention of the two funds: the smaller the ratio, the greater the
disappeared fund’s attrition was relative to the surviving fund’s. The prediction is that
log(R2,m/R1,m) enters negatively. We get (t-statistics in parentheses):
log(f12,m/f1,m) = -0.124 +0.053log((Q1,m+Q2,m)/Q1,m)
(-0.80) (0.20)
-0.154log(AVGACC12,m/AVGACC1,m)
(-0.49)

-0.399log(R2,m/R1,m)
(-2.95)
+

εm

R2 = 22.1%
N(obs) = 40

The coefficient is significant in the predicted direction with a two-sided p-value of 0.006.
Controlling for the usual cost considerations, funds charge more after absorbing investors
more self-selected for price insensitivity than their old investors.
5.

Summary and Conclusion
The puzzling price dispersion in the commodity-like money fund industry is

explained, to some degree, by dispersion in the demand curves funds face. Various
dynamics can select biased samples of consumers for the subset of investors that is most
important to a fund’s pricing; the one we explore in detail is the seasoning induced by a
fund’s own operating history. A history or distribution channel that selected
performance-insensitive investors encourages higher pricing, whether by the same fund
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or by a different fund that absorbs the investors. More generally, demand-curve variation
explains price variation that some cost considerations can not explain, as evidenced by
the predictive power of a demand-side model of re-pricing after mergers, beyond the
expected re-pricing due to changes in asset or account size. Our merger results are open
to reinterpretation as evidence for pricing of service quality; the influence of this
consideration on money management pricing is an area for future research.
This paper provides some simple examples of the potential and empirical
significance of shareholder self-selection. It is not intended to be exhaustive, and indeed
there are many directions one could take this line of reasoning. There is the natural
extension to other fund types, in particular to the actively-managed equity funds that are
the primary focus of the mutual-fund literature. This would introduce, however, a hazard
we avoided with money funds. The commodity perspective is inappropriate, not only
because funds’ realized returns differ substantially, but also because their investors view
themselves as buying amounts of expected excess returns. That is, an investor paying a
higher fee could believe she is buying sufficiently better prospects, and could be right.
Without an accurate measure of the cross section of prospects it is difficult to learn about
an investor from her fund choice. Rather than try to measure prospects, one could simply
assume that the smart money is the active money,15 in which case the investors who
remain in a fund of any type after more attrition are the relatively less performancesensitive ones. Our prediction is that a fund merging them in should charge relatively
more.
Another extension of our analysis is to the other determinants and implications of
self-selection. The characteristics of a fund’s investors would presumably reflect the
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marketing that brought them in, and, given the ease of transferring balances, the
marketing, performance and pricing of the family’s other funds. For example, a star
performer brings in money for the whole family (Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2000)), but
these new investors are not a random sample, and the funds in families that bring in
money this way should price accordingly.
The seasoning logic may also have some relevance to the proliferation of funds.
Just as a fund family would prefer not to merge inactive investors with active ones, it
may also prefer not to alter a fund’s management, marketing or pricing in a way that
brings active investors into a fund with only inactive investors remaining. The profitmaximizing strategy may be to leave the old fund alone, with its track record still visible,
and start a new fund for the new investors. A fund that has done badly is an
embarrassment but also an asset.
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Appendix: List of Mergers
Fund 1
Princor Cash Mgmt Fund

Fund 2

Date Q1
70

Q2

f1

f2

f12

EGT Money Market Trust

12/2/88

Shearson Daily Dividend

Hutton Cash Reserve Mgt.

12/2/88 4932

Shearson Daily Dividend

Hutton AMA Cash Fund

12/2/88 4932

1735 0.80 0.60 0.70

Shearson Daily Dividend

Shearson FMA Cash

12/2/88 4932

1942 0.80 0.66 0.70

Shearson Daily Dividend

Lehman Management Cash Res.

12/2/88 4932

288 0.80 0.71 0.70

Franklin MF

BIRR Wilson Money Fund

Emblem Prime Portfolio

Seagate Prime Obligations Fund

RBB MMP/Bedford Class

Home Cash Reserves

Centennial Cash Reserves

Massmutual Money Market Fund

Cortland Trust Gen MMF

Parkway Cash Fund

Dreyfus Worldwide Dollar MMF

Daiwa Money Fund

Prime Cash Series

So Farm Bureau Cash Fund

11/15/91

T Rowe Price Prime Reserve

Bell Atlantic MMP

12/27/91 4229

13 0.75 0.75 0.75

Prime Value Cash Inv Fund

Altura Prime Oblig Port

1/17/92 1111

191 0.51 0.67 0.50

Smith Barney Cash Portfolio

Vantage Cash Money Market Fund

6/26/92 1805

1120 0.52 0.56 0.64

T-Rowe Price Prime Reserve

USF&G Cash Reserve Fund

8/21/92 3844

Hanover Cash Mgmt Fund

CBC Cornerstone Prime MMF

10/2/92

Nations Prime MMF/Inv A

Nations MMF/Investor A

11/13/92

283

2 0.65 0.43 0.65

Ambassador MMF

St. Clair MMF/Prime Oblig

11/20/92

334

231 0.44 0.79 0.53

12/30/88 1429

26 1.02 1.34 1.00

2789 0.80 0.59 0.70

11 0.80 1.12 0.73

5/18/90

311

81 0.61 0.66 0.62

6/1/90

151

554 0.93 0.93 0.92

3/29/91

52

83 1.00 1.13 1.25

9/6/91

847

63 1.01 1.00 1.00

9/20/91 8989
756

234

9 0.01 1.10 0.47
23 0.94 1.24 0.99

28 0.78 0.97 0.74
309 0.67 0.58 0.58

Ivy MMF

American Investors Money Fund

1/29/93

17

3 0.85 0.63 0.85

Pacific Horizon Prime Fund

First Funds of America MMF

2/26/93 1160

111 0.56 0.55 0.52

Short Term Income/MMP Cl A

Daily Income Fund

6/18/93

791

340 0.83 0.70 0.91

Pioneer Cash Reserves Fund

Pioneer Money Market Account

7/1/94

63

107 0.75 1.29 0.88

Prime Cash Series

Voyageur Money Market Fund

10/28/94

834

17 0.99 0.85 0.99

Dreyfus/Laurel Prime I MMF/ Inv Cl

Dreyfus/Laurel Cash Mgmt/Inv

11/4/94

123

4 0.71 0.97 0.70

Smith Barney Cash Port/Cl A

Smith Barney Shearson Daily Div

11/18/94 3041 14658 0.64 0.70 0.62

Evergreen MMT/Cl Y

First Union MMP/Cl Y Shrs

7/7/95

247

56 0.32 0.41 0.45

American Capital Reserve Fund

Van Kampen Merritt MMF/Class A

9/22/95

342

20 1.00 1.08 1.02

Galaxy MMF/Retail

Shawmut Prime MMF/Invmt Shrs

12/1/95

610

271 0.74 0.71 0.71

Evergreen MM/Cl A

FFB Cash Management Fund

1/19/96

864

598 0.81 0.66 0.79

PaineWebber RMA MF/MMP

Kidder Peabody Premium Account

2/16/96 6401

516 0.59 0.70 0.59

PaineWebber RMA MF/MMP

Kidder Peabody Cash Reserve

2/16/96 6401

856 0.59 0.74 0.59

CoreFunds Cash Reserve/Cl C

Conestoga Cash Mgmt/Cl A Investor

4/12/96

19

2 0.73 0.56 0.75

Vista Global MMF/Vista Shrs

Hanover Cash Management

5/3/96

117

1451 0.57 0.58 0.59

Pegasus MMF

Prairie Money Market Fund/Cl A

Transamerica Cash Reserve

Transamerica Premium Cash Acct

11/30/90

434

127 0.45 0.45

0.57

Transamerica Cash Reserve

Transamerica Money Market Fund

5/31/91

330

16 0.46 1.30

0.63

Boston Company Cash Mgmt

American Express MMF

2/7/92

270

41 0.86 #N/A 0.97

Woodward MMF

Bison MMF/Money Market Port

1/1/93 1118

335 0.52 0.45 0.47

Evergreen MMT/Cl A

First Union MMP/Cl A Invmt Shrs

7/7/95

566 #N/A

Stagecoach MMF/Cl A

Pacifica Money Market Fund

9/6/96 3542

Nations Prime Fund/Primary A

Peachtree Prime MMF/Invmt Shrs

9/27/96 2467

39

1784 Prime MMF

BayFunds MMP/Investment Shrs

12/6/96

45 0.62 0.87 0.65

Legg Mason Cash Reserve

Bartlett/Cash Reserves Fund

12/20/96 1270

39 0.75 0.78 0.78

Franklin Money Fund

Templeton Money Fund

12/31/96 1237

115 0.75 0.96 0.68

9/13/96 1851

3

97

402 0.75 0.51 0.74

0.61 0.75

182 0.75 0.64 0.75
0.3

0.5

0.3

Stepstone MMF

HighMark Dvsfd Oblig/Cl A

4/25/97

529

141 0.73 0.75 0.75

Nations Prime/Inv B

Pilot S-T Divsfd Assets/Admin

5/16/97

358

263 0.55 0.52 0.55
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Endnotes:
1

In its fiscal year ended June 30, 1998, the Steadman American Industry Fund had an

expense ratio of 22.57%. Of the 1.347M shares held by investors at the beginning of that
fiscal year, 1.138M remained at the end.
2

Unless otherwise specified, all money funds from this point onward are Tier 1 and Tier

2 retail funds, as defined by MFR.
3

The annual total return used here is the average of the 7-day yields over the weeks in

that year.
4

This yields 56,981 non-overlapping observations. We take medians, rather than means,

because the smallest funds generate some enormous outliers, and some other funds jump
abruptly in size due to exogenous events such as mergers. We get a very similar picture
if we take means after eliminating asset-increases above 50%.
5

Petruno (1990). See Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2000) for a discussion of star-based fund

marketing.
6

Laderman (1992) indirectly quoting Dreyfus president and chief operating officer

Joseph DiMartino.
7

Complete results available upon request.

8

When a Putnam fund failed to attract much inflow with a price cut, one explanation

offered was that fee-sensitive investors “probably don’t do business with load-fund
companies such as Putnam.” Damato (1999).
9

As reported by IBC/Donoghue at www.ibcdata.com for the week ending July 13, 1999

10

Previous versions (available on request) of this paper used (implicitly) c=0bp, and

results were similar.
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11

Funds generally do not report information on average account size or the number of

shareholders. The data for this regression are from a 1995 Lipper survey which returned
average account size information for 72 funds in the Tier 1/Tier 2 retail category. These
are the 72 observations in the regression. It is worth noting that what a fund considers to
be one “account” is sometimes a master account with subaccounts. Lipper considers this
survey data not to have this problem, i.e. that the individual subaccounts are counted
separately.
12

These account-size figures were hand-collected for us by IBC/Donoghue from their

archives. They found data on 40 of the 47 surviving funds. Because we could not find
the fee of the disappeared fund for Boston Company Cash Management, we used 39
observations in the regression.
13

Complete results are available upon request.

14

Using data from Wiesenberger (1990), we relate fees to a fund's menu of services

including "telephone exchange privilege," "payroll deduction plan available," "bank draft
payment plan," "self-employed retirement plan," "individual retirement plan," "checkwriting privilege," "minimum amount initial purchase," and "minimum amount
subsequent purchase." The regressions (available upon request) show only the checkwriting service entering significantly, but it comes in negative, obviously not the cost or
benefit of this service. These results indicate that prices are not explained by the menu of
services, but they do not address quality.
15

One should bear in mind what this assumes about internet-fund investors.
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Table 1
Regressions of fees on attrition for retail and institutional funds
Panel A: Retail Funds
fi =
0.732 -0.011Qi
(42.0) (-2.78)
fi = 0.872 -0.009Qi
(16.9) (-1.95)
fi = 0.873 -0.020Qi
-0.001(Qi)2
(17.0) (-1.69)
(0.98)
fi =
0.877
(16.9)
Panel B: Institutional Funds
fi =
0.439 -0.057Qi
(21.1) (-4.05)
fi = 0.364 -0.064Qi
(8.64) (-4.50)
fi = 0.387 -0.136Qi
+0.015(Qi)2
(9.03) (-3.66)
(2.09)
fi = 0.353
(1.66)

+εi
-0.184Qi/MAXi
(-2.88)
-0.175Qi/MAXi
(-2.72)
-0.206Qi/MAXi
(-3.27)

+εi
+εi
+εi

+εi
+0.121Qi/MAXi
(2.03)
+0.133Qi/MAXi
(2.26)
+0.053Qi/MAXi
(0.83)

+εi
+εi
+εi

R2=3.0%
N=200
R2=6.9%
N=200
R2=7.4%
N=200
R2=5.1%
N=200
R2=14.7%
N=97
R2=18.3%
N=97
R2=22.0%
N=97
R2=0.7%
N=97

The net fee of fund i, fi , is measured in percent of net assets in the 1996 fiscal year from Lipper Analytical
Services. Q is the net asset size of the fund in the last week of 1995 measured in billions of dollars from IBC
Donoghue. Asset retention (Q/MAX) is measured as the net asset value of the fund in the last week of 1995
divided by the maximum size it attained in its history between November 1987 and the last week of 1995
from IBC Donoghue. Attrition is measured as one minus asset retention (1 – Q/MAX). t-statistics are
provided in brackets with bold indicating signficant difference from zero at the five percent level.
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Table 2
Cross Sectional Relation between Fees and Distribution Methods
In Annual Percent
Direct
Broker
Bank
Insurance
Affinity
Employee
log(Q)

Gross
1.604
1.578
1.339
1.684
1.525
0.843
-0.115

Net
0.929
1.131
0.939
1.161
1.119
0.549
-0.053

Waive
0.674
0.447
0.401
0.522
0.406
0.294
-0.062

Adv
-0.074
0.022
0.067
0.030
0.098
-0.216
0.046

Nadv
0.723
0.688
0.504
0.778
0.775
0.559
-0.052

12B1
0.283
0.423
0.369
0.352
0.248
0.207
-0.044

Direct=Broker
p-value

0.12
0.733

13.21
<0.001

9.90
0.002

2.82
0.094

0.40
0.529

12.07
<0.001

These regressions use fiscal-year 1995 data from Lipper. Fund i’s gross expense ratio is GROSSi and its fee
waiver is WAIVEi, so its net expense ratio NETi is GROSSI - WAIVEi. The net expense ratio has three
components: the advisory fee ADVi, the non-advisory fee NADVi, and the 12b-1 fee 12B1i. Using Lipper's
definitions, Directi is 1 if fund i is “Primary Direct” or “Secondary Direct,” Brokeri is 1 if fund i is “Dealer,”
“Broker/Dealer,” “Wirehouse” or “Captive,” Bank, Insurance, Affinity and Employee are 1 if fund i is “Retail
Banking,” “Insurance,” “Affinity,” or “Employee,” respectively. All are 0 otherwise. Fund i’s total net assets
at the end of its 1995 fiscal year is Qi. Each fee component is regressed on the indicator variables and log(Q).
At the bottom of each column is an F-test, and the associated p-value, for the null hypothesis that the
coefficients on Direct and Broker are the same. The number of observations in each regression is 244. In our
sample, the break-down by direct, broker, bank, insurance, affinity, and employee distribution channel is 47,
96, 73, 23, 4, and 1, respectively.
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Table 3
Non-parametric tests of fee changes following mergers
Panel A:
f2-f1
<0
=0
>0

Fees, unadjusted
<0
11
1
7

f12-f1:
=0
5
1
3

>0
2
1
14

Pearson Chi-Squared Test (4):
10.12 Waiving
10.53 Non-Waiving 12.05
2
2
Prob(χ >χ (.05))
0.038
0.032
0.017
Panel B:
Fees adjusted for costs and average account balance with no rounding
to the nearest basis point.
f12- fexp12:
f2-f1
<0
>0
<0
11
6
=0
2
1
>0
5
14
Pearson Chi-Squared Test (2):
5.87 Waiving
5.91 Non-Waiving 3.31
Prob(χ2>χ2(.05))
0.053
0.052
0.191
Panel C:
Fees adjusted for costs and average account balance with rounding.
f12- fexp12:
f2-f1
<0
=0
>0
<0
11
1
5
=0
0
2
1
>0
4
5
10
Pearson Chi-Squared Test (4):
Prob(χ2>χ2(.05))

12.12 Waiving
0.016

12.41 Non-Waiving 5.03
0.015
0.284

f1 and f2 are the net fees of the surviving and disappearing fund, respectively, in their last complete fiscal
years before the merger. f12,m is the net fee of the surviving fund in the first complete fiscal year after the
merger. fexp12 is the expected fee charged by the surviving fund after adjusting for cost factors, asset size and
average account balance. Using 1995 survey data from Lipper Analytical, the estimated relation between fees,
asset size and account size is log(fexp12/ f1) = - 0.077*log(Q12/Q1) - 0.169* log(AvgAcct12/AvgAcct1). Actual
asset size, Q, and average account balances, AvgAcct, around the merger were provided by IBC Donoghue.
Panel B does not round f12 - fexp12 to the nearest basis point while Panel C rounds f12 - fexp12 to the nearest
basis point. At the bottom of each panel is a χ2 test statistic, and its associated p-value, for the null hypothesis
that rows and columns are independent. We repeat the same test for funds waiving and not waiving fees premerger and report the test statistics.
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Table 4
Regressions of actual on predicted price changes
In Annual Percent
Panel A: All funds
Actual Fees:
0.019 +0.739[Q2,m ( f1,m-c)/(Q2,m ( f1,m-c)+Q1,m ( f2,m-c) )](f2,m-f1,m) R2=14.1%
f12,m-f1,m =
(1.36) (2.65)
N=45
Actual Fees Adjusted for Account Q and Asset Q:
f12,m - fexp12,m= 0.028 +0.655[Q2,m( f1,m-c)/(Q2,m ( f1,m-c) +Q1,m ( f2,m-c) )](f2,m-f1,m) R2=10.8%
(1.77) (2.12)
N=39
Panel B: Waiving Funds
Actual Fees:
0.028 +0.917[Q2,m ( f1,m-c)/(Q2,m ( f1,m-c)+Q1,m ( f2,m-c) )](f2,m-f1,m) R2=22.1%
f12,m-f1,m =
(1.18) (2.444)
N=23
Actual Fees Adjusted for Account Q and Asset Q:
f12,m - fexp12,m= 0.043 +0.801[Q2,m( f1,m-c)/(Q2,m ( f1,m-c) +Q1,m ( f2,m-c) )](f2,m-f1,m) R2=18.2%
(1.60) (2.00)
N=20
Panel C: Non-waiving funds
Actual Fees:
f12,m-f1,m = 0.0255 - 0.466[Q2,m ( f1,m-c)/(Q2,m ( f1,m-c)+Q1,m ( f2,m-c) )](f2,m-f1,m)
(1.395) (-0.648)

R2=3.13%
N=15

Actual Fees Adjusted for Account Q and Asset Q:
f12,m - fexp12,m= 0.0269 - 0.3236[Q2,m( f1,m-c)/(Q2,m ( f1,m-c) +Q1,m ( f2,m-c) )](f2,m-f1,m) R2=1.52%
(1.47) (-0.4487)
N=15
f1,m and f2,m are the net fees of the surviving and disappearing fund, respectively, in the mth money fund
merger, in their last complete fiscal years before the merger. f12,m is the net fee of the surviving fund in the
first complete fiscal year after the merger. Q1,m and Q2,m are the assets under management of the funds before
the merger. The second regression includes fexp12 for the expected fee charged by the surviving fund after
adjusting for cost factors, asset size and average account balance. Using 1995 survey data from Lipper
Analytical, the estimated relation between fees, asset size and account size is log(fexp12/ f1) = 0.077*log(Q12/Q1) - 0.169* log(AvgAcct12/AvgAcct1). Actual asset size, Q, and average account balances,
AvgAcct, around the merger were provided by IBC Donoghue. Panels B and C separate the sample into funds
that waived and did not waive prior to the merger. t-statistics are in parentheses and bold indicates significant
difference from zero at the five percent level.
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Figure 1. Net fees of Tier 1 and Tier 2 retail money funds charged in FY96, in annual percent.
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Figure 2. Excess FY96 return vs. FY96 fee. The excess return is the total return of the fund, minus the
average total return of all Tier 1 and 2 retail money funds over the same weeks.
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Figure 3. Performance persistence of Tier 1 and Tier 2 retail money funds. Excess return (relative to index
of all funds) in one year compared to excess return in the next. In basis points.
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Figure 4. Net two-week flow into money funds, sorted by past performance. Funds are sorted into 25bpwide bins by their week w performance, and the median percentage change in assets under management by
week w+2, net of the change due to the funds’ returns, is calculated for each bin.
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Figure 5. Fees and Assets of the Dreyfus Worldwide Dollar Fund. Fees (disjoint lines) are on the left axis,
and assets under management (continuous line) are on the right axis.

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

Retail

0.4

Institutional

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

(TNA at end of FY95)/(Max TNA ever up to then)

Figure 6. Relative yield vs. Attrition of Money Funds. Funds are sorted into five bins by their attrition over
the first 478 weeks of the MFR sample period, and the average annualized yield within each bin over the
terminal 26 weeks of the period is calculated.
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Figure 7. Fees charged by Tier 1 and Tier 2 retail money funds in their last fiscal years before the merger, in
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